ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL IMPASSE IN EGYPT

Egypt is the historic cultural and political leader of the Arab world. Not only has it been integral in its diplomatic relations with the Middle East and Northern Africa, it played a major role in its relations with major world powers. Egypt serves as the gateway between Africa and the Middle East. The current political impasse is reflected not only on deteriorating economic conditions in the country but also this internal political crisis could have dire regional consequences. The economic crisis and the need to uphold Egypt’s regional role will be discussed later. Let us now discuss the internal political landscape.

Egypt’s political landscape has been exceptionally turbulent for the past two years and more so since November 22, when President Morsi suddenly issued his controversial decree to mass upon himself draconian powers. A number of political parties and networks have been born, while some old parties still exist or have ceased to exist during the period of transition. The process towards openness and democratization is underway. However, as Egypt lacks the stable civil and political constellation as well as culture of political affiliation, a necessary condition for establishing and deepening democratization, the process will take time.The new constitution will define the rules of the political game and determine Egypt’s political trajectory for the foreseen future. As it was predicted by many, the work of the Constituent Assembly has immense consequences on Egypt. Liberal and secular political forces argue that the current circumstances under which the constitution is being drafted do not represent the ideals nor the values embodied by the January 25th Revolution. They believe that the current Constituent Assembly is neither representative of the Egyptian society nor is there equal representation amongst all political forces. Constitution building is usually very chaotic and difficult to muddle through. 'It is more so when dealing with really kind of fundamental issues and trying to hammer out rules for governing normal political life in the political community that is often very divided”, writes Nathan Brown.

The vague language characterizes new loopholes that could sanction the persistence of the age-old Egyptian authoritarianism. The new constitution has exactly that kind of provision and, moreover, a political language that has been the name of the game in Egypt for 60 years. Therefore, it seems as it was no revolution to put forward a new paradigm of politics. Examples abound:

• 1. Liberal and leftist forces were not only outraged by several articles in the draft of the constitution, which they saw as a threat to the civil nature of the state, basic human right related to freedom of expression and women’s rights. They have used the opportunity to turn over the political dispute over the drafting of a new constitution into a show down with the Islamists. They accuse Islamists of promoting a new “tyrant” by giving President Morsi the draconian powers not even his predecessors enjoyed according to the 1971 constitution. These include giving the President the right to appoint the judges in the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) and appointing a quarter of the Upper House of parliament rather than 10 members as it was the case in the 1971 constitution.[1]
• 2. The President according to the new constitution is not accountable before the parliament besides his almost absolute powers over the army and the police. The checks and balances on the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches are broadly defined, granting a degree of flexibility to the people in power to define their own prerogatives. For example, Article 15 sets a six-month limit on the emergency law, but does not detail baseline circumstances under which the President has the right to evoke it. Moreover, Article 19 gives the executive branch (read the President) almost absolute power with no specified checks and balances from the other branches of government. Thereafter Article 13 that calls upon the President to hold nation-wide referendums in matters of important national interest. The results of these referendums would be binding on all branches of government.
• 3. The articles related to women’s rights are cases in point. The new constitution at the beginning used the same wording used in the 1971 Constitution. However, later on in the draft takes these rights away with this provision for sharia law. The reason it is there is because woman activists want a very strong gender equality provision and Islamists and Islamic religious scholars vehemently oppose these demands, since they negate that fact that Islamic personal status law - that's marriage, divorce and inheritance - is not gender-neutral.
• 4. The public discourse on the process of constitution building (as well as on politics in general) is consumed by religious and often marginal issues that Islamists more or less put forward. The debate on constitution is turning into a clash of ideology rather than policy. Serious issues such as dragging Egypt out of an economic slump, tackling widespread poverty and reforming an age-old authoritarian state bureaucracy are reduced by Islamists to “public morals issues”, “the preservation of Egypt’s Arab and Islamic identity”, and “We will not accept an alternative to the laws of our God”; that is to say, the foundation of the constitutional process and transition to democracy has become about “religion” rather than about “the citizen”.

Egyptians are dead set on making Islam a central tenet of the daily life. However, a majority of them would not necessarily vote for Islamists or wish to have Islamic Shariah law as the basis of the constitution, and legislation based on the Islamic penal code. Indeed, the intensified political conflict that have characterized Egyptian politics since the ousting of Mubarak indicate clearly there are a significant percentage of the Egyptians who harbour deep apprehension about Islamic influence in governance and legislation. From the time Islam swept into this country in the seventh century, Egyptians have always been able to combine an omnipresent religiosity with a certain light-heartedness and tolerance about their faith. Religion has been always visible everywhere one goes, but Egyptians handle religion and faith with practical solemnity. This is what Islamists want to dispense with.

The majority of the non-Islamist forces were holding high hopes that the Supreme Administrative Court would rule that the formation of the Constituent Assembly by the dissolved People’s Assembly would be found illegal so that the process could start all over again.[2] However, the court ruled to refer the entire case to the Supreme Constitutional Court, which traditionally takes a relatively long time to rule on cases. For Islamists, this was taken to be a victory, since the ruling would give them the time to pass through the draft and even put through a popular referendum. Legal experts believe that the road is now clear for the Islamists to work out their wish to finish the draft and put it to a popular vote. Therefore, secular and non-Islamists forces are left with no other option but to escalate their opposition to the draft and the dominance of Islamists. In that case it would be difficult to rewrite the constitution, even if the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled later that the CA was unconstitutional.

There is a deadlock between the two forces that threaten the Constituent Assembly likely to collapse from within due to the intensified deadlock between the MB in one side, and all other forces (including the Salafis) on the other. Indeed, opponents of the MB put high hope on the Egyptian people for not accepting a Constitution that lacks the necessary checks and balances on all branches of governments nor the loopholes that jeopardize the basic rights of citizens.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the logic of majority politics

One of the more important challenges ahead is whether the new constitution will be “The Law of the Land” for all Egyptians or merely reflects the ideological priorities of the Islamists who happen to be the dominant power for the time being. The constitution will set important terms for the executive and legislative powers. There are big question marks on how President Morsi and the Muslim brotherhood so far handle this very important process. They are severely criticized not only from liberals, but also by Islamic conservatives as such. As seen by their opponent, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood put their focus on securing power and control over state institutions.[3] Actions have also shown that increasing control has also been taken over Egyptian media. Meanwhile, the MB has been able to outmanoeuvre large segments of the opposition active under the initial months of the revolt (including key personalities, such as ElBaradei). Whereas this quest for power is to bring Egypt to stability or simply for the purpose of achieving maximum influence remains to be unseen. In the face of it, how the political process will evolve will ultimately decide Egypt’s overall political posture.

The Muslim Brotherhood have decades of organizational and administrative experience. Aside from its expansive nationwide networks, its services to the needy have included selling meat at wholesale prices, offering subsidized school supplies, helping with medical treatment, and providing hand-outs of fresh produce, sugar, cooking oil, and other items. These activities have won it popular followings. The Brotherhood also has long had leading and instrumental parts in the country’s various professional syndicates and labour unions. The doctors’, lawyers’, and engineers’ syndicates, for example, have historically been dominated and led by Brotherhood members. At the journalists’ syndicate, reporters say that some of the board members affiliated with the Brotherhood have provided the best and most efficient services to the syndicate’s members to date—health care plans, for example.

The Brotherhood constituted the largest organized power that operated outside the framework of the regime of Mubarak. Over the past 35 years, the Brotherhood has stepped up their game, using their organizational skills, preaching function and ability to bend with the wind and reach understandings with the security apparatus. After the breakout of the revolution, the problems facing this current within the Brotherhood exacerbated, putting the entire group in trouble. The emergence of several Islamist groups on the political scene and internal disagreements at the heart of the group — which became more salient because of the greater number of political options and the futility of the argument for unity in the face of suppression — fuelled a crisis. The more narrow-minded group kept the organization together by getting rid of all minds that were more open and ready to engage in dialogue about the future of the Brotherhood and its approach to politics.

The Brotherhood’s leadership has been keen to keep its Freedom and Justice Party merely as a “political arm” for the organization. In other words, the Brotherhood have insisted on maintaining the group as it was under the former regime — an entity that nurtures its members in a stereotypical fashion, which forms the basis of loyalty to the group. With this fixation on loyalty, the Brotherhood became more like a sect that narrows down its circle of trust to preserve its internal coherence and expands its influence through the provision of services, like it did under the former regime. This sectarian organizational mind-set retains the sectarian nature of everything connected to it, including its political arm, which is only an offshoot of the organization, much like a charity organization. The Brotherhood has kept the same logic of operation adopted under the former regime and was able to pull the carpet from under the opposition and the secular revolutionary forces.

The failure of Islamists and leftist and liberal political forces to agree on the principal framework for the new constitution and the group that was selected to draft it has witnessed an outbreak of political conflict between the Islamists and their opponents. What’s difficult in the Egyptian case, argues Nathan Brown, is that “Egyptian political forces aren't used to having to deal with each other. They had this strong presidency that was sitting on top of them for so long. And now suddenly they're facing each other in the room with nobody sort of controlling things. So, liberals, secularists, Islamists, leftists, people from all across the political spectrum have to hammer out an agreement, and they're not used to having to do that.”

The current atmosphere of frustration will continue to surface for some time to come as layers of the Egyptian society wants a full change now with all the benefits that comes with it. Change in Egypt though is intimately linked to economic progress and growth. Unless the MB’s dominated government is able to secure jobs and lower unemployment, social tensions and political frustration will grow – challenges that in the end undermine democratic efforts. Fortunately, Egypt, unlike Libya, has a number of democratic watchdogs that will scrutinize the incumbent administration efforts to turn Egypt more democratic. These watchdogs include strong trade-unions, domestic (and international) NGOs, virtual networks (and social media), independent media and a vibrant parliament.

The Opposition: Grand slogans and hazy political platforms

A liberal Egypt was briefly alive among the people in Tahrir Square who desperately wanted to be a part of the modern world. What the Liberal forces and the young revolutionary discovered, once Mubarak was overthrown and the country began to have a genuine political life for the first time since the Free Officers seized power in 1952, was that they had little support among those who lived in a different reality. They discovered that to start a revolution is not to own it. The liberal parties have never been able to find much support from the underclass, whether in poor urban districts or rural Egypt. They could not penetrate the decades-old informal networks that have long been dominated by family and tribal alliances, religious affiliations, or agents of the former regime. Analysts are sceptical about the impact of the alliances given their lack of connection with grassroots. It is essentially an upper middle-class phenomenon. A close looking at these blocs makes one find however, the very same old political orbit, protesting the Islamists’ ascendancy without offering a clear alternative. The current juggling for political position and the sudden proliferation of coalitions is symptomatic of the way politics continues to be conducted by tiny elite with no experience of political affiliation and no grassroots strength.

After the ousting of Mubarak, at least six political alliances and coalitions involving tens of political parties from the left, right and centre have emerged to date, but what role will they play in Egypt’s political map? With six political alliances and coalitions involving tens of political parties from the left, right and centre emerging to date, no wonder that many Egypt watchers see this a paradigm shift in bloc building momentum as a qualitative shift in the political map. One consequence of interrupting parliament’s five-year term less than six months after the People’s Assembly was elected is the deluge of political alliances, coalitions and initiatives, the whole panoply of party machinations the goal of which is to secure more seats in the next parliament. Then there are the ex-presidential candidates who are hoping to strengthen their power bases among supporters. Yet rather than reshaping the post-revolution political map and this vast array of activities appears to be aggravating the existing fault-lines of the Islamist-Liberal and Leftist divide. If there will be a difference on the political platforms that oppose the political hegemony of the Islamists, then the three following contenders will be of high importance:

• 1. Former secretary general of the Arab League and ex-presidential candidate Amr Moussa is a case in point: He has recently acquired new titles: leader of the Coalition of the Egyptian Nation, the Egyptian Conference Party as well as honorary president of the liberal Wafd party. Within two weeks he has come to preside over two new groupings – the Coalition of the Egyptian Nation and the Congress of the Egyptian Conference Party – both comprising a range of political parties, many of them unknown quantities, that say they have chosen to unite because they share vaguely articulated nationalist or patriotic principles but which stress only the “civil” nature of their bloc-building, civil being a euphemism for secular. The Egyptian Conference Party is an attempt to merge over 20 existing parties. It is an ambitious project that will require the constituent parties to disband. If it goes ahead, many party leaders will find themselves suddenly demoted to rank and file members of the Conference Party under Moussa’s leadership. The Coalition of the Egyptian Nation, on the other hand, is just that, a coalition, though it remains unclear whether it’s a political or electoral alliance.
• 2. The former director general for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei expressed his intention to run for president before the elections, but withdrew his candidacy shortly thereafter, stating he did not wish to run for president under military rule. ElBaradei stayed detached from parliamentary elections by avoiding affiliation with any particular group and established Al-Dostour Party in April, after the parliament had been dissolved. Al-Dostour will incorporate with a number of small like minded parties to make a coalition in the upcoming parliamentary elections. This will be the first time Al-Dostour participates and the real strength of ElBaradei in Egyptian politics will be tested.
• 3. If Mohamed ElBaradei has the virtue of being well known internationally, Nasserist Hamdeen Sabbahi, who came third in post-revolution presidential elections, enjoys considerable popularity among sections of the working classes due to his upbringing and background. Sabbahi is probably the only non-Islamist politician who is able to connect with the grassroots and the poor in Egypt. Sabbahi was jailed several times over the course of his political career and has a solid reputation for his opposition to state policy under presidents Sadat and Mubarak. His unwavering support for last year's uprising appeals to many protesters and young activists. Sabbahi participated in last year's Tahrir Square uprising from the outset, and was slightly injured while taking part in anti-regime demonstrations. He has used that momentum to form Popular Egyptian Current. Sabbahi has consistently voiced — along with other liberal and leftist forces — opposition to perceived Islamist hegemony over political life in Egypt.

It has by now become a growing trend to create political alliances in the hope of challenging the political dominance of the Islamists. However, opposing the Islamists is not enough of a political platform. Furthermore, the personal presence in the public debate of ex-presidential candidates cannot be enough to compete in the next parliamentary elections. Election is about organization, financial resources and presence in the street, none of these non-Islamist political figures seem to acquire. Predicting the outcome of elections in Egypt is always a tricky business, but the final shape of the constitution and the parliamentary election law will have a deep impact on how the process of transition to democracy will develop. The constitution has been the focus of bitter political battles since March 2011. Once finalized, it will remain a subject of contention, and the emerging coalitions are likely to shift shape again as their parties begin to define themselves in terms of their differences with other parties and not just their position against the Islamists.

The parliamentary election law remains up in the air. Will it be based on party lists, individual candidacy or a mixture of the two? In the 2011 parliamentary elections it was a mixture, and we all know what the outcome have been. The Islamists due to their grassroots work fare better as individual candidacy than as party lists. The fact that a majority within the Constituent Assembly favours party-based proportional representation, has led to optimism among leftists and liberals and give them some hopes that they may do better in the next election. Their chances of better results in the coming election are related to the performance of Morsi’s government in the coming months. Austerity measures, such as cutting subsidies on energy and the way strikes demanding, among other things, better wages, are handled, will have immediate consequences for the Muslim Brotherhood’s popularity, a fact that goes a long way to explaining the contradictory official statements.

[1] The 1971 Constitution under which Hosni Mubarak governed had many democratic aspects to it; however, several loopholes, such as the emergency law, allowed for the executive to expand on its prerogatives.

[2] The dissolved People’s Assembly was found unconstitutional by the Administrative Court in April 2012, because the then People’s Assembly violated the law when it decided that the majority of the Constituent Assembly members should be parliamentarians.

[3] What critics of the Brotherhood call "ikhwanization of Egypt," with "ikhwan" meaning "brothers."