ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL IMPASSE IN EGYPT

Egypt is the historic cultural and political leader of the Arab world. Not only has it been integral in its diplomatic relations with the Middle East and Northern Africa, it played a major role in its relations with major world powers. Egypt serves as the gateway between Africa and the Middle East. The current political impasse is reflected not only on deteriorating economic conditions in the country but also this internal political crisis could have dire regional consequences. The economic crisis and the need to uphold Egypt’s regional role will be discussed later. Let us now discuss the internal political landscape.

Egypt’s political landscape has been exceptionally turbulent for the past two years and more so since November 22, when President Morsi suddenly issued his controversial decree to mass upon himself draconian powers. A number of political parties and networks have been born, while some old parties still exist or have ceased to exist during the period of transition. The process towards openness and democratization is underway. However, as Egypt lacks the stable civil and political constellation as well as culture of political affiliation, a necessary condition for establishing and deepening democratization, the process will take time.The new constitution will define the rules of the political game and determine Egypt’s political trajectory for the foreseen future. As it was predicted by many, the work of the Constituent Assembly has immense consequences on Egypt. Liberal and secular political forces argue that the current circumstances under which the constitution is being drafted do not represent the ideals nor the values embodied by the January 25th Revolution. They believe that the current Constituent Assembly is neither representative of the Egyptian society nor is there equal representation amongst all political forces. Constitution building is usually very chaotic and difficult to muddle through. 'It is more so when dealing with really kind of fundamental issues and trying to hammer out rules for governing normal political life in the political community that is often very divided”, writes Nathan Brown.

The vague language characterizes new loopholes that could sanction the persistence of the age-old Egyptian authoritarianism. The new constitution has exactly that kind of provision and, moreover, a political language that has been the name of the game in Egypt for 60 years. Therefore, it seems as it was no revolution to put forward a new paradigm of politics. Examples abound:

• 1. Liberal and leftist forces were not only outraged by several articles in the draft of the constitution, which they saw as a threat to the civil nature of the state, basic human right related to freedom of expression and women’s rights. They have used the opportunity to turn over the political dispute over the drafting of a new constitution into a show down with the Islamists. They accuse Islamists of promoting a new “tyrant” by giving President Morsi the draconian powers not even his predecessors enjoyed according to the 1971 constitution. These include giving the President the right to appoint the judges in the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) and appointing a quarter of the Upper House of parliament rather than 10 members as it was the case in the 1971 constitution.[1]
• 2. The President according to the new constitution is not accountable before the parliament besides his almost absolute powers over the army and the police. The checks and balances on the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches are broadly defined, granting a degree of flexibility to the people in power to define their own prerogatives. For example, Article 15 sets a six-month limit on the emergency law, but does not detail baseline circumstances under which the President has the right to evoke it. Moreover, Article 19 gives the executive branch (read the President) almost absolute power with no specified checks and balances from the other branches of government. Thereafter Article 13 that calls upon the President to hold nation-wide referendums in matters of important national interest. The results of these referendums would be binding on all branches of government.
• 3. The articles related to women’s rights are cases in point. The new constitution at the beginning used the same wording used in the 1971 Constitution. However, later on in the draft takes these rights away with this provision for sharia law. The reason it is there is because woman activists want a very strong gender equality provision and Islamists and Islamic religious scholars vehemently oppose these demands, since they negate that fact that Islamic personal status law - that's marriage, divorce and inheritance - is not gender-neutral.
• 4. The public discourse on the process of constitution building (as well as on politics in general) is consumed by religious and often marginal issues that Islamists more or less put forward. The debate on constitution is turning into a clash of ideology rather than policy. Serious issues such as dragging Egypt out of an economic slump, tackling widespread poverty and reforming an age-old authoritarian state bureaucracy are reduced by Islamists to “public morals issues”, “the preservation of Egypt’s Arab and Islamic identity”, and “We will not accept an alternative to the laws of our God”; that is to say, the foundation of the constitutional process and transition to democracy has become about “religion” rather than about “the citizen”.

Egyptians are dead set on making Islam a central tenet of the daily life. However, a majority of them would not necessarily vote for Islamists or wish to have Islamic Shariah law as the basis of the constitution, and legislation based on the Islamic penal code. Indeed, the intensified political conflict that have characterized Egyptian politics since the ousting of Mubarak indicate clearly there are a significant percentage of the Egyptians who harbour deep apprehension about Islamic influence in governance and legislation. From the time Islam swept into this country in the seventh century, Egyptians have always been able to combine an omnipresent religiosity with a certain light-heartedness and tolerance about their faith. Religion has been always visible everywhere one goes, but Egyptians handle religion and faith with practical solemnity. This is what Islamists want to dispense with.

The majority of the non-Islamist forces were holding high hopes that the Supreme Administrative Court would rule that the formation of the Constituent Assembly by the dissolved People’s Assembly would be found illegal so that the process could start all over again.[2] However, the court ruled to refer the entire case to the Supreme Constitutional Court, which traditionally takes a relatively long time to rule on cases. For Islamists, this was taken to be a victory, since the ruling would give them the time to pass through the draft and even put through a popular referendum. Legal experts believe that the road is now clear for the Islamists to work out their wish to finish the draft and put it to a popular vote. Therefore, secular and non-Islamists forces are left with no other option but to escalate their opposition to the draft and the dominance of Islamists. In that case it would be difficult to rewrite the constitution, even if the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled later that the CA was unconstitutional.

There is a deadlock between the two forces that threaten the Constituent Assembly likely to collapse from within due to the intensified deadlock between the MB in one side, and all other forces (including the Salafis) on the other. Indeed, opponents of the MB put high hope on the Egyptian people for not accepting a Constitution that lacks the necessary checks and balances on all branches of governments nor the loopholes that jeopardize the basic rights of citizens.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the logic of majority politics

One of the more important challenges ahead is whether the new constitution will be “The Law of the Land” for all Egyptians or merely reflects the ideological priorities of the Islamists who happen to be the dominant power for the time being. The constitution will set important terms for the executive and legislative powers. There are big question marks on how President Morsi and the Muslim brotherhood so far handle this very important process. They are severely criticized not only from liberals, but also by Islamic conservatives as such. As seen by their opponent, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood put their focus on securing power and control over state institutions.[3] Actions have also shown that increasing control has also been taken over Egyptian media. Meanwhile, the MB has been able to outmanoeuvre large segments of the opposition active under the initial months of the revolt (including key personalities, such as ElBaradei). Whereas this quest for power is to bring Egypt to stability or simply for the purpose of achieving maximum influence remains to be unseen. In the face of it, how the political process will evolve will ultimately decide Egypt’s overall political posture.

The Muslim Brotherhood have decades of organizational and administrative experience. Aside from its expansive nationwide networks, its services to the needy have included selling meat at wholesale prices, offering subsidized school supplies, helping with medical treatment, and providing hand-outs of fresh produce, sugar, cooking oil, and other items. These activities have won it popular followings. The Brotherhood also has long had leading and instrumental parts in the country’s various professional syndicates and labour unions. The doctors’, lawyers’, and engineers’ syndicates, for example, have historically been dominated and led by Brotherhood members. At the journalists’ syndicate, reporters say that some of the board members affiliated with the Brotherhood have provided the best and most efficient services to the syndicate’s members to date—health care plans, for example.

The Brotherhood constituted the largest organized power that operated outside the framework of the regime of Mubarak. Over the past 35 years, the Brotherhood has stepped up their game, using their organizational skills, preaching function and ability to bend with the wind and reach understandings with the security apparatus. After the breakout of the revolution, the problems facing this current within the Brotherhood exacerbated, putting the entire group in trouble. The emergence of several Islamist groups on the political scene and internal disagreements at the heart of the group — which became more salient because of the greater number of political options and the futility of the argument for unity in the face of suppression — fuelled a crisis. The more narrow-minded group kept the organization together by getting rid of all minds that were more open and ready to engage in dialogue about the future of the Brotherhood and its approach to politics.

The Brotherhood’s leadership has been keen to keep its Freedom and Justice Party merely as a “political arm” for the organization. In other words, the Brotherhood have insisted on maintaining the group as it was under the former regime — an entity that nurtures its members in a stereotypical fashion, which forms the basis of loyalty to the group. With this fixation on loyalty, the Brotherhood became more like a sect that narrows down its circle of trust to preserve its internal coherence and expands its influence through the provision of services, like it did under the former regime. This sectarian organizational mind-set retains the sectarian nature of everything connected to it, including its political arm, which is only an offshoot of the organization, much like a charity organization. The Brotherhood has kept the same logic of operation adopted under the former regime and was able to pull the carpet from under the opposition and the secular revolutionary forces.

The failure of Islamists and leftist and liberal political forces to agree on the principal framework for the new constitution and the group that was selected to draft it has witnessed an outbreak of political conflict between the Islamists and their opponents. What’s difficult in the Egyptian case, argues Nathan Brown, is that “Egyptian political forces aren't used to having to deal with each other. They had this strong presidency that was sitting on top of them for so long. And now suddenly they're facing each other in the room with nobody sort of controlling things. So, liberals, secularists, Islamists, leftists, people from all across the political spectrum have to hammer out an agreement, and they're not used to having to do that.”

The current atmosphere of frustration will continue to surface for some time to come as layers of the Egyptian society wants a full change now with all the benefits that comes with it. Change in Egypt though is intimately linked to economic progress and growth. Unless the MB’s dominated government is able to secure jobs and lower unemployment, social tensions and political frustration will grow – challenges that in the end undermine democratic efforts. Fortunately, Egypt, unlike Libya, has a number of democratic watchdogs that will scrutinize the incumbent administration efforts to turn Egypt more democratic. These watchdogs include strong trade-unions, domestic (and international) NGOs, virtual networks (and social media), independent media and a vibrant parliament.

The Opposition: Grand slogans and hazy political platforms

A liberal Egypt was briefly alive among the people in Tahrir Square who desperately wanted to be a part of the modern world. What the Liberal forces and the young revolutionary discovered, once Mubarak was overthrown and the country began to have a genuine political life for the first time since the Free Officers seized power in 1952, was that they had little support among those who lived in a different reality. They discovered that to start a revolution is not to own it. The liberal parties have never been able to find much support from the underclass, whether in poor urban districts or rural Egypt. They could not penetrate the decades-old informal networks that have long been dominated by family and tribal alliances, religious affiliations, or agents of the former regime. Analysts are sceptical about the impact of the alliances given their lack of connection with grassroots. It is essentially an upper middle-class phenomenon. A close looking at these blocs makes one find however, the very same old political orbit, protesting the Islamists’ ascendancy without offering a clear alternative. The current juggling for political position and the sudden proliferation of coalitions is symptomatic of the way politics continues to be conducted by tiny elite with no experience of political affiliation and no grassroots strength.

After the ousting of Mubarak, at least six political alliances and coalitions involving tens of political parties from the left, right and centre have emerged to date, but what role will they play in Egypt’s political map? With six political alliances and coalitions involving tens of political parties from the left, right and centre emerging to date, no wonder that many Egypt watchers see this a paradigm shift in bloc building momentum as a qualitative shift in the political map. One consequence of interrupting parliament’s five-year term less than six months after the People’s Assembly was elected is the deluge of political alliances, coalitions and initiatives, the whole panoply of party machinations the goal of which is to secure more seats in the next parliament. Then there are the ex-presidential candidates who are hoping to strengthen their power bases among supporters. Yet rather than reshaping the post-revolution political map and this vast array of activities appears to be aggravating the existing fault-lines of the Islamist-Liberal and Leftist divide. If there will be a difference on the political platforms that oppose the political hegemony of the Islamists, then the three following contenders will be of high importance:

• 1. Former secretary general of the Arab League and ex-presidential candidate Amr Moussa is a case in point: He has recently acquired new titles: leader of the Coalition of the Egyptian Nation, the Egyptian Conference Party as well as honorary president of the liberal Wafd party. Within two weeks he has come to preside over two new groupings – the Coalition of the Egyptian Nation and the Congress of the Egyptian Conference Party – both comprising a range of political parties, many of them unknown quantities, that say they have chosen to unite because they share vaguely articulated nationalist or patriotic principles but which stress only the “civil” nature of their bloc-building, civil being a euphemism for secular. The Egyptian Conference Party is an attempt to merge over 20 existing parties. It is an ambitious project that will require the constituent parties to disband. If it goes ahead, many party leaders will find themselves suddenly demoted to rank and file members of the Conference Party under Moussa’s leadership. The Coalition of the Egyptian Nation, on the other hand, is just that, a coalition, though it remains unclear whether it’s a political or electoral alliance.
• 2. The former director general for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei expressed his intention to run for president before the elections, but withdrew his candidacy shortly thereafter, stating he did not wish to run for president under military rule. ElBaradei stayed detached from parliamentary elections by avoiding affiliation with any particular group and established Al-Dostour Party in April, after the parliament had been dissolved. Al-Dostour will incorporate with a number of small like minded parties to make a coalition in the upcoming parliamentary elections. This will be the first time Al-Dostour participates and the real strength of ElBaradei in Egyptian politics will be tested.
• 3. If Mohamed ElBaradei has the virtue of being well known internationally, Nasserist Hamdeen Sabbahi, who came third in post-revolution presidential elections, enjoys considerable popularity among sections of the working classes due to his upbringing and background. Sabbahi is probably the only non-Islamist politician who is able to connect with the grassroots and the poor in Egypt. Sabbahi was jailed several times over the course of his political career and has a solid reputation for his opposition to state policy under presidents Sadat and Mubarak. His unwavering support for last year's uprising appeals to many protesters and young activists. Sabbahi participated in last year's Tahrir Square uprising from the outset, and was slightly injured while taking part in anti-regime demonstrations. He has used that momentum to form Popular Egyptian Current. Sabbahi has consistently voiced — along with other liberal and leftist forces — opposition to perceived Islamist hegemony over political life in Egypt.

It has by now become a growing trend to create political alliances in the hope of challenging the political dominance of the Islamists. However, opposing the Islamists is not enough of a political platform. Furthermore, the personal presence in the public debate of ex-presidential candidates cannot be enough to compete in the next parliamentary elections. Election is about organization, financial resources and presence in the street, none of these non-Islamist political figures seem to acquire. Predicting the outcome of elections in Egypt is always a tricky business, but the final shape of the constitution and the parliamentary election law will have a deep impact on how the process of transition to democracy will develop. The constitution has been the focus of bitter political battles since March 2011. Once finalized, it will remain a subject of contention, and the emerging coalitions are likely to shift shape again as their parties begin to define themselves in terms of their differences with other parties and not just their position against the Islamists.

The parliamentary election law remains up in the air. Will it be based on party lists, individual candidacy or a mixture of the two? In the 2011 parliamentary elections it was a mixture, and we all know what the outcome have been. The Islamists due to their grassroots work fare better as individual candidacy than as party lists. The fact that a majority within the Constituent Assembly favours party-based proportional representation, has led to optimism among leftists and liberals and give them some hopes that they may do better in the next election. Their chances of better results in the coming election are related to the performance of Morsi’s government in the coming months. Austerity measures, such as cutting subsidies on energy and the way strikes demanding, among other things, better wages, are handled, will have immediate consequences for the Muslim Brotherhood’s popularity, a fact that goes a long way to explaining the contradictory official statements.

[1] The 1971 Constitution under which Hosni Mubarak governed had many democratic aspects to it; however, several loopholes, such as the emergency law, allowed for the executive to expand on its prerogatives.

[2] The dissolved People’s Assembly was found unconstitutional by the Administrative Court in April 2012, because the then People’s Assembly violated the law when it decided that the majority of the Constituent Assembly members should be parliamentarians.

[3] What critics of the Brotherhood call "ikhwanization of Egypt," with "ikhwan" meaning "brothers."

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ON THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTION BUILDING IN EGYPT

Egypt's beleaguered Constituent Assembly (CA) moves closer to completing the long-awaited draft constitution. The 100-strong panel, which was picked in June, is headed by senior judge Hossam el-Gheriany. Its constitutionality is currently being examined by a court. The CA has been harshly criticized for its large proportion of Islamist-leaning members and for its exclusion of Copts, women, Nubians, Bedouins and other minorities. They accuse the CA of throwing away the economic and social rights of Egyptians. Last June, a number of liberal members and representatives of non-religious parties initiated a mass walkout to protest what they saw as the assembly's unrepresentative character. Their stated reason for resigning from the assembly was to allow greater representation for women, young people and Coptic Christians, while also registering their objection to perceived "Islamist monopolization" of the constitution-writing committee.

There are those within the liberal/secular/non-religious camp who believe that the current constitution, even if it is approved in a popular referendum, will be a merely temporary document tied to the current Islamist political majority rather than a CONSTITUTION as the primary contract or “law of the land” by which the government of a nation or state is set out and organized, and to which all of government, citizens, corporate persons and other laws must defer in the event of any conflict.

The troubled assembly still faces the risk of dissolution by court order on grounds that it was drawn up by the now dissolved People's Assembly, the lower house of Egypt's parliament. In October, Egypt's Supreme Administrative Court is set to rule on the assembly's constitutionality, or lack thereof. There is a possibility that the CA can be dissolved by a court ruling sending the constitutional process back to square one. The Supreme Administrative Court, however, seems to give the time and the chance for the CA to conclude its work. There are those who believe that the Court will not intervene due to the difficult and messy political state of affairs in the country.

The opponents of Islamists as well as the legal commentators merely put much emphasis on the criticism of the composition of the CA and the draft of the new constitution infringing on freedoms, and it seems as if they do not realize the extent to which Qur’anic narratives are infused into the new constitution. There are a number of issues regarding the role of religion in the process of constitution building that will be discussed below and should be discussed within IDEA in so far as the constitution building in the WANA region is concerned. I am not aware if these issues were discussed earlier, especially in the Indonesian context. However, the issue of infusing Qur’anic notions and concepts into the constitutions of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and elsewhere in the WANA region are worth to be illuminated and discussed. 

THE CULTURE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY 

Egypt is known for having one of the earliest administrative and legislative codes in history. Throughout the history of this old country, formidable human cultures and civilizations were incepted and brought into being by offering the most advanced form of governance and management. Occasionally, this self-perception plays out against the need to learn from cross-cultural experiences from other countries that have gone through similar political transition. 

Prominent legal experts and some CA members have voiced objection to seeking assistance from constitutional experts or politicians from other parts of the world. The process of writing a new constitution is a case in point. They voiced the often repeated dicta: Egypt has all what it needs to write its own constitution, since the Egyptian legal experts wrote or helped to write the constitutions of the region (i.e. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Yemen, Assad’s Syria, Kuwait, Gulf states, to mention only a few). For example, last week one political activist has been urging Egypt's secular camp to communicate with the European Parliament and the United Nations Human Rights Council. His call was not met with any enthusiasm even among his own peers on the secular camp!

THE ASCENDANCY OF QURA’NIC CONCEPTS AND DISCOURSE

At the heart of the controversy with writing the new constitution and the stalemate within the CA, Islamists that were swept into power by electoral landslide are tempted to think that “at last we can dictate our ultimate goal of envisioning the Islamic Umma”. The Islamists in the CA – from the Salafi Nour Party and the Muslim Brotherhood – are seeking a more comprehensive implementation of Sharia. It is not clear, however, on which premises or how it will be operationalized and integrated into a modern jurisprudence. It is important, therefore, that Islamic notion and concepts have to be operationalized into workable politics and precise legal framework. This seems not to be the case in the current draft of the new Egyptian constitution.

The text of the new constitution identifies the people who live in the country as those whose identity is primarily Islamic. The sovereignty of a clear defined territorial state and the people as the citizen/national of the state was relegated to a secondary importance. The most serious fallacy, though, with the new constitution is that it has been dominated by the imprecise Qur’anic concepts of politics and discursive formations of Umma, Sharia, and Shura and so on. Discursive formations here is taken to be the ways of establishing orders of truth, or what is accepted as 'reality' in a Muslim Umma/society. Let us discuss in some detail these three concepts for the sake of illumination.

First, the concept of “Umma” refers in the Muslim narrative to the community of believers that Prophet Mohamed had established in Medina between the years 622 to 632 AD. The concept is vague and even confusing politically and legally insofar as it contradicts the “universal” claim of Arab/Islamic Umma with the “local” call for nationalism in the sense of being “Egyptian”. This discourse maintains the fictive nature of the post-colonial Arab state that has been plagued by overlapping and, ultimately, confusing identity of religion, Arabism and ethnicity. To have a constitution that maintains these values instead of replacing them with clear conceptions of citizenry, equality and human rights, will constitute the blow for the aspiration to transition to democracy. 

Second, Sharia law literally means the religion of Islam’s code of conduct. Islamic scholars refer to Sharia as the Islamic system of law and the totality of the way of life. To Islamists, Sharia law was founded on the words of Allah as revealed in the Quran, and traditions gathered from the life of the Prophet. It is the “law of Allah” and bound to be the best of all since it is derived from the Qur’an (Allah’s Words) and the Sunnah (the sayings and practices of the Prophet). Therefore, Sharia can very well guide all aspects of Muslim public and private life. Islamists believe that the Sharia law expresses the highest and best goals for all societies on Earth. 

Sharia law has been adopted in various forms by many countries, ranging from a strict interpretation in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and northern states of Nigeria, Sudan, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and al-Qaeda occupied Somalia, to a relatively liberal interpretation in much of Malaysia, Pakistan, Bahrain, Yemen and United Arab Emirates. There are utterly miserable experiences of practicing Sharia law in Muslim countries. Examples abound, whether by the Sudanese dictator like Jaafar Nimeiry or by a democratically elected politician like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in Pakistan. Family matters such as marriage and divorce are the most common aspects of Sharia law practiced in most Muslim nations. Even somehow democratically ruled Muslim nations such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, Turkey etc., family matters (inheritance, marriage, divorce, child custody etc.) are governed by Sharia law, till today.

Therefore, it is important to illuminate that the concept of Sharia (like that of Liberalism, Socialism, etc.,) can mean different things to different people. Modern experience from applying Sharia throughout the Muslim world confirms this view. Throughout history, people in different countries and in various local communities often do not distinguish clearly whether and to what extent their norms and practices are based on local tradition, tribal custom, or religion. Those who adhere to a confrontational view of Sharia tend to ascribe many undesirable practices to Sharia and religion overlooking custom and culture, even if high-ranking religious authorities have stated the opposite. Having followed the Islamists’, and especially the Salafis’, of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, debate on adopting Sharia law in the post-revolutionary constitutions is the paragon of virtue. 

Third, Vague Islamic “concept of Shura” is given a primary place, especially in the first Article. The word of Shura is mentioned three times in the Quran as an admirable pursuit, and is a concept to depict the ideal way from Muslim to organize their affairs. The Quran makes “Shura” or “participation with others in making a decision that concerns them,” subsequent to and a consequence of the faith in God. So while the concept of Shura might provide some support for democracy within the context of Islamic theology, by itself this argument is too simple. While some Islamists claim that Shura serious and effective participation in making a decision, there are no elaborations in how the principle can be put in a workable political framework. 

On the other hand, Democracy as an ideology has survived as comprehensive intellectual tools for change. Democracy has maintained its common appeal to the modern human mind, at least with regards to its basic principles, in spite of the considerable criticism that it has been facing conceptually and practically. There is confusion between “democracy” and the concept of “Shura”, which per se is a vague idea, even in Islamic jurisprudence. 

By the same token, in Article 9 there is proviso to protect the prophet of Islam and the messengers of the Abrahamic religions, which maintain the fact that Egypt has to be “a religious state” and more precisely Sunni – one that seriously undermines the concept of citizenship and equality between the people in a modern democracy. 

WOMEN ARE TRAPPED BETWEEN LACK OF CULTURE OF ORGANIZING AND ISLAMISTS’ OUTLOOK

The new draft of constitution includes a paragraph that would limit the rights held by women to those compatible with the “rules” of Islamic jurisprudence. Every other aspect of the draft constitution is constrained merely by the “principles” of Islamic jurisprudence, a less arduous interpretation. The 1971 constitution, contained a paragraph that also constrained women’s rights according to the rules of Islamic jurisprudence, but in the current political landscape dominated by Islamists, there is a fear that the wording will maintain the underprivileged status bestowed for women’s rights.

This says it all: only seven women, most of whom share many of patriarchal and conservative values dominant within the Assembly, were chosen to participate in the CA. Despite protests from lawyers and women’s rights activists, the paragraphs on women’s rights seem to go the Islamists way. In a country with weak “culture of political organizing”, there are now connected, well-organized and inclusive grassroots women’s organizations in Egypt that could be able to dictate their rights in the new constitution. The same applies, more or less, to Libya and Tunisia. The political and societal organization of women is an area where International IDEA needs to work in the region for many years to come.

CAN AN OPEN POLITICAL SPERE RENDER ISAMISTS MORE DEMOCRATIC?

Islamists’ views on the politics of the region, including the writing of the new constitutions, are put forward with a kind of self-righteousness that most of their opponents are lacking. Indeed, Islamists have basically won the battle of public discourse, they have also spent decades systematically reshaping the public culture throughout the region. And why should Islamists, with no democratic culture to speak of, behave like good democrats who believe in pluralism? Islamists were thus naturally well positioned to take advantage of the new political atmosphere after the Arab revolts. By no means, the transitional process toward freedom and democracy could have avoided the reality of significant presence of Islamist in the region at all levels of society.

The Salafi influence on the drafting of the new constitution has triggered a deep sense of anxiety that would, ultimately threaten the transition to democracy and the aspiration for freedom and equality. The contradictions of ultraconservative religious aspiration clashed with day-to-day politics of the chaotic political landscape of Egypt. The Political Salafism that became prominent after the Egyptian Revolution is in fact the most dangerous product of the police state and the stagnant society of the authoritarian regimes that ruled Egypt since the early 1950s.

In the new political atmosphere after the Arab revolts we are witnessing an enormous political energy within these societies and the only way for the Islamists to remain at the center of political life is to adapt – it is a simple Shakespearian logic, be or not to be! The Islamists have always been reluctant to democratic values seemingly contradict their religious outlook. The Muslim Brothers as well as the Salafis are entering into a political arena that stamped by various restraints that will not only limit their presumed “ultimate goal” of envisioning an Islamist Umma, but also the open social and political sphere will push them toward more adaptation with Realpolitik and, ultimately, democracy. 

The coherence of the Islamist organizations is dependent on the coherence of their political arms/parties, and so the weakness of the political arms would dismantle the Islamist organization by making them more fluid as they, ultimately, lose support from hesitant members, as was the case with the youth members of the MB during and after the revolution. Indeed the largest Salafi party, al- Nour who grabbed almost a quarter of the votes when civilian powers combined could not seize as many has shocked the Egyptian polity, is experiencing, as we write, a battle of life or death. The internal rift within the party comes as a natural cost for being politically active in the public sphere. Even the Muslim Brotherhood were not spared the internal conflict between different factions within the organization that spilled out publicly between President Morsy and those who oppose his policies within the MB, most notably the MB kingmaker, Khairat el-Shater. President Morsy has to show that he is the president of all Egyptians and not the Muslim Brotherhood’s president of Egypt. So far, President Morsy has a quite good approval rates, much better than his electoral mandate. 

The religious-civilian polarization and all the sectarian publicity led by Salafis was in fact a project to stifle the dream of democratization that the young revolutionaries of Tahrir sought to achieve through sectarian incitement and fascist practices. The ball is now in the court of the secular, liberal and democratic powers that should provide a coherent alternative capable of mobilizing the public, not the least for the sake of reflecting the wide spectrum of the Egyptian society within the political institutions. In the open landscape of Egyptian politics, Islamists seem to go through the phase of self-discovery as they figure out their margin of maneuver and the ability to envision an Islamist Umma. However, the Egyptian open political landscape could possibly reveal the contradictions within the Islamist project and potentially its bankruptcy. 

As was the case with the religious movement that went into politics in Europe, Latin America, India and more recently Indonesia, the liberal and secular movements can create the dialectic of political equilibrium. For the time being, comparing Islamists of the WANA region with other world regions (such as Latin America) are difficult, since WANA is the only place where the dominant opposition consists of strongly centralized and ideological parties with a religious agenda. 

There are good examples elsewhere in the world that can be an inspiration to transform Islamists in the region of the state of self-discovery to honest players in the game of democratic politics. The Congress Party of India was able to coopt with the communalist ideology of Hindu nationalists, most notably Bharatia Janata Party (PJP) in the 1980s and, thereby, helped bring these religious/nationalist movements into the ideological mainstream. In the 1990s, through the game of democratic politics, the PJP went from almost political obscurity into a holder of state power. Another example is the case of the Greek, Spanish and Portuguese communist parties of the late 1970s: Like the Islamists of Egypt and Tunisia, they too benefited from a democratization process that they did not trigger. Yet the European communists never achieved the control over elected parliaments that Islamists now enjoy in WANA region. Whatever their agendas, the communist parties had no choice but to negotiate and play into Realpolitik. 

Hamdi Hassan is a Senior Political Advisor, West Asia and North Africa Programme, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

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THE EGYPTIAN STREET, THE OPPOSITION AND THE PROSPECT FOR DEMOCRATIZATION

Democracy is not about merely winning elections. It is about creating commonalities of inclusion for all other political forces in the country. The country is deeply divided, brutally bruised as well as saddened and confused. For the time being, it seems that the political crisis in Egypt has reached a point of no return. The political impasse can have very serious repercussions. President Morsi decided to proceed to challenge his opponents through forcing a referendum on the new constitution. The Islamists’ opponents responded to step up the action on the streets, and ultimately marched to stage civil protest around the presidential palace.

There still loom an illusion that a little bit of dictatorship in Egypt would be alright in order to enable Morsi to take control of the situation, as well as to prevent matters from getting out of hand and the state from heading towards collapse. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) seem to be refreshing up ideas from Egyptian politics pre-January Revolution, but the last few weeks massive demonstrations all over streets and squares of Egypt proved them wrong. Still Egypt faces very serious challenges to attempts at political reforms and the process of transition to democracy.

THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT

The National Salvation Front, the umbrella opposition group, an array of liberal, leftist and progressive parties, attempt to search for consensus with an overall aim to confront the Islamist’s political hegemony. The Egyptian opposition is not feckless but they are outmanoeuvred due to the lack of a solid organization on the ground, and most importantly, they are divided among themselves.

Opposition forces Egypt’s National Salvation Front rally together in Tahrir Square as others join hundreds of thousands of protesters -strong made their way to the presidential palace in Cairo’s Heliopolis district to denounce Morsi's decree and draft of the new constitution. The National Salvation Front was recently established by ElBaradei, Sabbahi and Amr Moussa in addition to other opposition figures and parties. 

Peoples from all walks of life took part in demonstrations, which coincided with a strike by Egyptian journalists who marched from their syndicate headquarters to Tahrir. Many tourism sector workers, teachers, artists and cultural workers also staged protests in the Square. Cheers, cries and prayers could be heard as thousands of people converged on Tahrir Square. Many voiced their intention to stay in Tahrir to ensure that it was not infiltrated by the Muslim Brotherhood and to avoid clashes with police. President Morsi left the Presidential Palace in a humiliating way to stay at his humble apartment in a Cairo suburb. That very act reflected the deep political crisis on-going in Egypt.

The National Salvation Front (a coalition of leftist, liberal and centrist parties) called for Egypt’s youth to continue to mass peacefully in “all the squares of Egypt” until their other demand, that the referendum on the new constitution is cancelled. For the Islamists’ surprise they appear to be setting the state for a massive general strike and, at the same time, make themselves heard all over the world. Thusly, the myth of the Islamists as the sole organized group is obliterated. The opposition fears that the MB makes no distinction between a referendum on the Law of the Land and a merely general election. It has nothing to do with winning narrowly or even substantially. It is the ability to make wise political judgment to rally the largest majority possible around a shared set of principles.

The leadership of the National Salvation Front has seemed content to press their civil disobedience campaign, hoping that public pressure and the violent response from President Morsi's supporters - which has already led to several deaths - would derail the proposed referendum. The Egyptian opposition remains divided, struggling to decide whether to vote "no" or to boycott entirely a process they view as unfairly rigged by Islamist forces. By the same token, supporters of Morsi claim that as the democratically elected president of Egypt he has the right, even the duty, to push forward the draft constitution for referendum on December 15. Under these circumstances, Islamist forces want to accelerate the return to formal democratic politics, because they can win. Secular forces cannot afford to play that game, however.

The Front’s official goal is to halt the vote entirely, and representatives are reluctant even to discuss contingency plans if the referendum goes ahead. But major strikes from Egypt’s labour movement, which the opposition had hoped would be the crucial blow against Morsi, have failed to materialise, making the vote likely to proceed as planned. However, due to the massive spontaneous streets rallies against president Morsi and the Islamists gave some confidence to the opposition. Thereafter the MB has lost significant popularity over the past six months after perceived over-reaching and poor performance in government.

THE EGYPTIAN STREET AS A POLITICAL FACTOR

The 25 January revolt is the only real popular revolt in Egyptian history and this has made the democratic ideas behind it a very significant paradigm today in Egypt, despite the disparities and factionalism of the political forces. Even though it was almost two years ago since Mubarak was toppled, the popular strength persists as we have witnessed in the streets of Egypt over the last few days, with a clear message that the people of Egypt will never accept political tyranny, whether from the MB or any other regime. Morsi appears more to be clashing with something important, the “spirit of the revolution” rather than with a merely political opponent to the MB. 

Many believe that President Morsi should have spoken directly to the people in an attempt to convince them of the necessity to have a constitution, an elected parliament and to proceed with political reforms. Instead, the MB seems to be in a hurry to politically dominate the state and thereby to impose their agenda, believing that their opponents are weak and will not be able to stop them. 

Many among the opposition forces believe that President Morsi is only expressing the political wishes of the MB from the Presidential Palace. They claim that President Morsi is dictated to by the Shura Council of the MB for all decisions and decrees that ultimately appeared hasty and gratuitous. Several of Morsi’s close advisors were embarrassed because his latest Constitutional Declaration came as a complete surprise for them and they could not answer how and why it came about! Many of them have resigned already. 

The Egyptian people send a clear message: it is no longer possible to run the country without lasting popular participation. There is so much political energy in the Egyptian public space that will make it impossible for any president or any group to deviate from the will of the people. The idea of limited democracy, in the sense that once the people vote their voices can then be ignored for four years, seem not to work anymore for Egyptians.

Due to the show of street force by protesters and opposition forces, Egyptians have now a clear option between a constitution written by one party in an exclusive manner, and a new, elected constituent assembly. This is a tangible triumph. Before the mass protests, it was obvious that the MB and Morsi had hoped to impose upon the Egyptian people a constitution that was written by an Islamist constituency as the only way out of the impasse. But this plan has failed with Morsi’s authority dramatically diminishing.

Egyptians will be free to vote or not for the constitution, and will be free to cast a Yes or a No vote. If it passes and becomes the new constitution, then new parliamentary elections would follow in February. As the political impasse deepens, Egyptians may vote down the constitution. In that case, a new constituent assembly will be elected in March, and will have six months to craft a new constitution.

The Egyptian people are capable of handling the two most challenging obstacles in transition to democracy: To eject the military from politics; and to include the Muslim Brotherhood in the political process and transform the group energy from messianic religious aspirations to political force with practical and workable politics. Despite the deep scepticism of Egypt’s middle and upper-middle class, the MB and Salafis groups have not so far offered any solutions whatsoever for the country’s intractable problems, which drives many to be convinced that it is more constructive and better to include them in the political process.

Hamdi Hassan is a Senior Political Advisor, West Asia and North Africa Programme, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

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Wide Rejection of the Constitutional Draft in Egypt

By Hamdi Hassan

The Constitutional Assembly had a landmark opportunity to lay the groundwork for representing human rights in tomorrow’s Egypt, but its current draft fails to meet that standard because of vague language or limitations that destroy the essence of many rights. The “draft of the new constitution” has also deepened the conflict between the Islamists and the varieties of Liberal and Leftist forces in the country. The political landscape is as polarized as ever: we have the Islamists who are accused of not being able rule a country that needs to pass a difficult and messy transitional phase. We have also the Liberals and Leftist groups who are accused of lacking the ability to organize and therefore the capacity to rule.

At first sight one observes that the text lacks the legal precision and the rigor that entails of a constitution, given the fact that constitutional language is fundamentally different from legal, political or, for that matter, any ordinary language.
The flexibility and agility of the language were severely criticized by legal scholars. Gaber Nassar, a Professor of Constitutional Law, who is also a member of the CA, has criticized Islamist groups of showing “something not finished and does not look like a constitution”. Nassar claims that the draft should be written in a rigorous and precise language that clarifies and guides the structure and content of the “Law of the Land”.

For all focus on religion, the drafted constitution actually curtails religious freedom, extending the right to establish places of warship only to the Abrahamic religions – Islam, Christianity and Judaism – while discriminating against the country’s other religions, such as the Shi’a and Baha’i. It also provides no guarantee that citizens will be protected from gender, income or class discrimination.

Few days ago, a press conference was held by 29 liberal and leftist parties announcing they will demonstrate next Friday under the slogan “Egypt is not a small country farm”, to voice their reject that “one political group monopolizing the process of constitution building”. Prominent opposition leaders announced that they will participate on Friday demonstrations, such as Mohamed ElBaradei and Hamdeen Sabahi, leader of the leftist coalition “Popular Trend”.

Below are some of the issues that were taken up by the critics of the “draft” and the Constitutional Assembly:

1. Human rights activists are appalled by the fact that Egypt’s constitution after the revolution does not mention the word “torture”, but instead refers only to the lesser formulation of “physical harm.” Article 5 fails to clearly prohibit torture, but only prohibits “lesser forms of physical or psychological harms”. Crimes of torture remain rampant in Egypt as the Penal Code does not fully criminalize torture. This makes it difficult to prosecute police for torture that occurred in the Mubarak era. Failing to fully prohibit torture is especially surprising given the fact that anger against police abuse played a central role in the Egyptian Revolution. Such a provision would in particular endanger the Egypt’s Shia Muslims who hold different interpretations than the majority Sunnis regarding to issues essential to how the history of Islam is interpreted , some of which regarding the “rightly guided caliphs.”
2. Surprisingly, the Salafis reject the draft of the constitution for other reason than those of the liberal and leftist groups; they wish to include more enhanced mechanisms for development and application of Sharia. A prominent Salafi preacher, Yasser Borhami, stated that the draft constitution «does not reflect what has been agreed upon in the CA committees, and does not represent the first reading of the draft of the constitution”. He said further that « many of the draft proposals were neglected, which will not make them give up, such as the interpretation of the principles of Sharia, which includes the foundations of jurisprudence that are considered consensual by the Sunnis.
   Some prominent Salafis within the CA argue that such a provision would halt the spread of Shi’ism in Egypt and put an end to attempts to build special worship-houses (called Husseiniyas). The official religious institution Al-Azhar representative to the Assembly said it very clear they will “resist the spread of Shi’ism, which harms God and his Prophet.”
3. Another source of controversy, and perhaps the most significant one in terms of the future of human rights legislation in Egypt, is the proposal many Salafi members of the CA are currently pushing on: i.e., establishing the religious institution Al-Azhar as the sole body authorized to interpret Sharia, which article 2 sets out as the main source of legislation, and granting Al-Azhar a vetting role to certify the consistency of all legislation with Sharia. If article 4 is included in the final draft it will effectively create a legislative scrutinizing role for an unelected, unaccountable body with no recourse to judicial review. Al-Azhar and together with the Salafis has an appalling history of harassing intellectuals and writers, that was so intensive during the 1990s.
4. The articles on education (23, 24 & 27) are indicative of the CA’s efforts to create an authoritarian state, which disciplines and shapes its citizens, in this case, through education. Education in this draft constitution is highly regulated by the state, which directs every aspect of the educational process, dismissing creative bottom-up initiatives. The aim is to create model citizens who abide by a predetermined, exclusionary conception of citizenship. By doing so, the assembly is producing a document that massacres Egypt’s pluralism and creative minds.
5. Article 24 of the draft constitution specifies that “religious education and Arabic language are two basic courses in education curricula of all types and in all stages.” It further adds that “the state should work to ‘Arabize’ sciences and knowledge in preparation for ‘Arabizing’ the process of education in all stages”.
   The attempt to insert a mandatory form of ethical preaching — referred to above as “religious education” — at the university level emanates from a desire to have citizens besieged with certain official values and ethics that are promoted using public money to herd people into a predetermined type of identity, rather than celebrate diversity and encourage creativity.
6. According to Article 184 of the new draft, the Supreme Constitutional Court would only be allowed to scrutinize proposed bills before they are passed by the People's Assembly. Legal experts believe the provision is at odds with the court’s primary role of ruling on the constitutionality of laws. The court was subjected to severe criticism after it ruled in June that the Islamist-led People's Assembly should be dissolved because a law governing its election was unconstitutional. Gaber Nassar, a member of the Constituent Assembly, accuses Islamists within the CA of looking for revenge on the court and they are using the constitution-writing process to settle old scores. Moreover, the head of the court, Maher al-Beheiry, issued a statement depicting the draft document is "a step backwards and a flagrant intervention in the court's affairs." He stated further that the SCC would remain in permanent session until amendments are made to stop provisions that "endanger the court’s independence."
7. The troubled assembly still faces the risk of dissolution by court order on the grounds that it was drawn up by the now dissolved People's Assembly, the lower house of Egypt's Parliament. In October, Egypt's Supreme Administrative Court is set to rule on the assembly's constitutionality, or lack thereof. It is reported that the Court waited to scrutinize how the draft defines its authority and mandate before issuing a decision on the very existence of the CA! Like the SCC, the new draft presented an outline that significantly weakens the Supreme Administrative Court and, therefore, many believe that it is imminent that the court will issue a rule to dissolve the CA, thereby, sending the constitutional process back to square one.

Hamdi Hassan is a Senior Advisor, West Asia and North Africa Programme,

 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

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Reflections on the Referendum on the Draft of the New Constitution

Egypt's fiercely disputed draft constitution is certain to pass after unofficial results from the second and final round of referendum voting show that around 64 percent of Egyptians voted in its favour. However, the voter turnout is as low as 30 percent and official results are not expected until Monday.

 During this final phase of Egypt’s constitutional referendum, 25,495,237 voters were eligible to take part in the polls. The voting took place in 176 general polling stations and 6,274 sub-stations in 17 governorates. It was a relatively humdrum day with fewer incidents of violence but much more systemic irregularities.

The Supreme Electoral Commission extended the voting hours from 7pm to 11pm due to "high voter turnout.” However, the turnout in the second phase is not expected to exceed the 32 percent witnessed in the first phase. In fact, it is reported that it is only 30 percent, due to the irregularities and discouragement of voters in areas where Islamists have little support, especially in the Delta.




Allegations of systemic rigging
 The opposition has complained of violations and systematic rigging again, which they believe threaten the legitimacy of the entire process. Accusations of voting improprieties throughout the day included allegations of rigged votes, the banning of rival voters from entering polling stations, the delayed opening of some polling stations, MB and Salafi attempts to influence and direct voters, non-cooperation of judges with monitors, and a refusal by judges to receive official complaints.

For example, human rights watchdogs reported that Copts in the governorates of Minya and Qena in Upper Egypt were prevented from leaving their villages to cast their votes. As a result, in some cases, the army and the police had to provide safe passages for the Copts to cast their votes.

 Instances like this have led to outcry. In Ismailia Governorate, bordering the Suez Canal, members of the opposition group the National Salvation Front announced in the afternoon the withdrawal of their delegates, who were monitoring the referendum. They withdrew in objection to “massive violations.”

 There are fears of further electoral violations. Electrical power was cut off from most of the villages in the central Delta Menoufiya Governorate during voting hours. Power has been completely cut off since 5:30pm for 20 villages and some others experienced intermittent stoppages in the early hours of the evening. Some people fear that the MB will use this opportunity to rig the votes. In the presidential elections, Menoufiya overwhelmingly voted for former presidential candidate Ahmed Shafiq against Mohamed Morsi.

The committee overseeing the two-stage vote said its investigations showed no major irregularities in voting during the first round, which covered about half of Egypt's 51 million voters.


Voting patterns
The second round of voting looks much like the first round of voting on the draft of the new constitution. Voting patterns highlighted societal divisions such as those between urban cities versus the country side, that arguably have to do mostly with differing levels of education. The pattern of voting also reflected an age-specific split, as the second phase of the referendum on the draft constitution got underway. Most of those voting "no" were predominantly university students, fresh graduates or young professionals who feel that the draft constitution fails to meet their expectations and their dream of a better Egypt, for which they revolted two years ago.

Moreover, the condition of utter poverty and analphabetism is tightly connected with the “yes” vote in the referendum on the constitution. In Upper Egypt, the turnout was low but the approval was high. For example, in the Governorate of Meniya in Upper Egypt, the constitution was approved by 84 percent. This was more or less the case in other provinces in Upper Egypt from Fayoum to Beni Suef down to Aswan, where the level of poverty and analphabetism is very high by any standard. This pattern also applies in the case of predominantly Bedouin provinces of Marsa Matrouh, New Valley in the West desert and the two provinces of Sinai Peninsula.


Fears of spreading violence

There are fears that the MB and Islamists intend to pass the constitution at any cost, and that this might fire back on the government, causing the government to lose control of the political process and trigger violence throughout the country. Many observers believe that the Muslim Brotherhood has divided Egyptians more than ever before.

What happened the last few weeks in Alexandria is being hailed by some as a paragon of virtue. In this city where Islamists (especially Salafis) have been the dominant force for many years, thanks to the negligence of the government, things have changed during the last few months. The Islamists have not only lost influence in the city, but ordinary citizens have been engaging in heavy fighting with Islamists to throw them out of the mosques and, ultimately, out of the city.

The same phenomena has been spreading to other cities in Cairo, in the Nile Delta (most notably Tanta and the Textile city of Mahla) and the Suez Canal’s three major cities, Ismailia, Port Said and Suez.

Threats and intimidation from Islamist thugs, and Salafi thugs specifically, directed to opposition figures have become the normal state of affairs. Prominent opposition figures like ElBaradei had been the target of threats from Salafi thugs, called “Hazemoun,” (supporters of the Salafi former presidential candidate Hazem Salah Abu Ismail). ElBaradei was warned not to cast his ballot in the second round of the referendum. He received various threats from unknown persons, making it difficult for him to go and vote.


Resignation of vice-president

Mahmoud Mekki announced last night that he had resigned as vice-president. Mekki was uncomfortable in politics. “I realized a while ago that the political nature of the work does not fit my career as a judge," he said in a statement. Mekki asserted that this was not the first time the thought of resignation had crossed his mind.

There are suspicions in the air about other possible reasons for his resignation. It was disclosed earlier that Mekki had not been informed of Morsi's power grab. In addition, the timing of his resignation might be linked to the lack of a vice-presidential post under the draft constitution.

Upon his return from Pakistan on 23 November, Mekki was reportedly surprised to find out about the constitutional decree issued by President Morsi a day earlier, and then later a law to "guard the revolution." Mekki's plan to resign was then apparently delayed due to his recent attempt to manage a national dialogue between political forces and the presidency in order to resolve "the current state of political polarization."

Some might take Mekki's resignation, coming a few hours before the end of the final phase of the referendum, as swayed by the fact that the new constitution does not require a vice president

Mekki started his career in the police force, graduating from the Police Academy and serving as a Central Security Forces officer. Later, he earned a bachelor's degree in law and eventually headed Egypt's Court of Cassation. A reformist judge, Mekki is most well-known for advocating for judicial reforms under the former Mubarak regime. Mekki was one of those judges who opposed the rigging of parliamentary elections in 2005, widely held to be fraudulent. His brother, Judge Ahmed Mekki, is minister of justice in current government.

Looking forward

If the draft of the constitution is approved, the opposition will stir up more trouble since it will not have received sufficiently broad backing amid questions about the fairness of the vote. Protesters were initially provoked by Morsi’s power grab on 22 November 2012, which gave him powers likened to the powers held by a pharaoh. Morsi was, ultimately, forced to issue a second decree two weeks ago that amended a provision putting his decisions above legal challenge.

The Islamist-sponsored constitution will pass with a narrow majority; the United States continues to take a wait-and-see approach. In general, European governments have been more direct in criticizing Morsi’s actions but equally hesitant to take meaningful action. As disparate actors seek to coordinate foreign policy through the European Union institutions, they often possess dissimilar interests and differing views of the region. This makes coordinated action difficult. The weakness of Egypt’s opposition groups only strengthens the alliance between the MB and the US government. This alliance can, ultimately, help ease up European criticism and allow for a business as usual relation with Morsi.

The United States has always tolerated domestic transgressions for the sake of stability and cooperation on strategic initiatives and this continues today. The US has demonstrated leniency toward the MB since Morsi ascended to presidency of Egypt. This has led many to question how an Islamist organization formerly designated as a terrorist group by the US government became a close ally, seemingly overnight. It was the dramatic toppling of Mubarak and realpolitik demands in the new post-Mubarak context that led the US to become a close ally overnight.

Indeed, these are different times with very intense political energy in the streets, combined now with fierce opposition to Islamists and their political agenda. Morsi’s actions and style of decision making have already provoked large swaths of the population. One might argue that Morsi contributed towards societal polarization in Egypt, as well as a new determination to resist the Islamist political agenda. This polarization will be very costly for Egypt’s economic recovery and political reforms.

Late on Saturday, Morsi announced the names of 90 new members he appointed to the upper house of parliament (Shura Council). A presidential official said the list was mainly composed of liberals and other non-Islamists. However, this was refuted by Morsi's main opponents, including liberal, socialist and other parties who refused to take any seats.

Legislative powers, now held by Morsi because the lower house of parliament was dissolved earlier this year, will pass to the upper house under the new constitution. Two-thirds of the 270-member upper house was elected in a vote this year, with one third to be appointed by the president. Morsi, elected in June, had not named them till now. Morsi's Islamist party and its allies dominate the assembly.

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